Supplemental Statement

Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

For Six Month Period Ending May 31, 2007 I-REGISTRANT 1. (a) Name of Registrant (b) Registration No. Johnson, Madigan, Peck, Boland & Stewart, Inc. 5776 (c) Business Address(es) of Registrant 1300 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following: If an individual: (a) CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT (1) Residence address Yes \square No 🗆 Yes 🔲 No 🗆 (2) Citizenship Yes \square (3) Occupation (b) If an organization: (1) Name Yes \square Yes ☐ Yes ☐ (2) Ownership or control (3) Branch offices Ö (c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in items (a) and (b) above.

3	If you have previously filed Exhibit C1	state whether any change	s therein have	e occurred during this 6 mon	th reporting period
٥.	in you have previously fined Eximent C	, state vinetici any change.	3 111010111 11440	occurred during tims o mon	in reporting period.
		Yes 🗍	No 🖆		

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4 AND 5(a).

Yes If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? No \square

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attomey General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any person period?	s ceased acting as partners, office Yes No	ers, directors or similar official	s of the registrant dur	ing this 6 month reporting
If yes, furnish the fol	llowing information:			
Name	Posi	tion	Date (connection ended
(b) Have any persor	s become partners, officers, directives No 🖸	ctors or similar officials during	this 6 month reportin	g period?
If yes, furnish the fol	lowing information:			
Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
5. (a) Has any person i	named in <u>ite</u> m 4(b) render <u>ed</u> servi	ces directly in furtherance of th	ne interests of any for	eign principal?
	Yes No			
If yes, identify each	such person and describe his serv	ice.		
		NOT APPLICA	BLE	
	yees or individuals, who have filed the registrant during this 6 month			ir employment or
If yes, furnish the fo	llowing information:			
Name	Position or c	onnection	Date terminated	
or will render serv secretarial, or in a	nth reporting period, has the registricts to the registrant directly in forelated or similar capacity? Yes the similar capacity?	urtherance of the interests of ar	any other capacity, any foreign principal(s	ny persons who rendered) in other than a clerical or
•	-	01.1	D 111	.
Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
	gistration statements been filed by persons who have not filed the re	Yes No	ems 5(a) and 5(c) of the	ne supplemental statement?

NOT APPLICABLE

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

	Yes	☐ No		reporting perio		
If yes, furnis	h the following informat	ion:				
Name of for	reign principal			Date of	termination	
9 Have you a	equired any new foreign	oringinal ² during t	his 6 month reporti	ng period?		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
6. Have you at	Yes			ng period:		
If yes, furnis	h the following informat	ion:				
Name and a	ddress of foreign princip	oal		Date ac	quired	
9. In addition reporting pe		7 and 8, if any, lis	t foreign principals	whom you con	tinued to represent during the	month
ProExport C	Colombia					
ProExport (Executive (Colombia Office of His Highness Sh	eikh Mohammed	Bin Rashad Al Mak	oum through DI	LA Piper US LLP	
		eikh Mohammed	Bin Rashad Al Maki	oum through Dl	LA Piper US LLP	
		eikh Mohammed	Bin Rashad Al Makı	oum through Dl	LA Piper US LLP	
		eikh Mohammed	Bin Rashad Al Makı	oum through Di	LA Piper US LLP	
Executive C		eikh Mohammed	Bin Rashad Al Makı	oum through Di	LA Piper US LLP	
Executive C	Office of His Highness Sh					
Executive C	Office of His Highness Sh BITS A AND B Have you filed for each Exhibit A ³	ch of the newly ac	quired foreign prine	cipals in Item 8	the following:	
Executive C	Office of His Highness Sh BITS A AND B Have you filed for each Exhibit A ³ Exhibit B ⁴	ch of the newly ac	quired foreign princ	cipals in Item 8		
10. EXHIB	Office of His Highness Short BITS A AND B Have you filed for each Exhibit A ³ Exhibit B ⁴ If no, please attach the	ch of the newly ac Yes	quired foreign prind No No No	cipals in Item 8	the following: PPLICABLE	
Executive C	Office of His Highness Short BITS A AND B Have you filed for each Exhibit A ³ Exhibit B ⁴ If no, please attach the	ch of the newly ac Yes	quired foreign prine No No No No No Dibits A and B previ	cipals in Item 8	the following:	u
10. EXHIB	BITS A AND B Have you filed for each Exhibit A ³ Exhibit B ⁴ If no, please attach the Have there been any compared to the second control of the second	Yes Yes Yes Changes in the Exlete 6 month period?	quired foreign prine No	Dipals in Item 8 NOT AI Sously filed for a	the following: PPLICABLE any foreign principal whom yo	u

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a) (9).) A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

3 The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form CRM-157 (Formerly OBD-67), sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

4 The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form CRM-155 (Formerly OBD-65), sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

11.	During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes \(\bigvee \) No \(\Bigcap \)
	If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:
	SEE ATTACHMENT #1 - ProExport Colombia SEE ATTACHMENT #2 - Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al Maktoum
12	During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity ⁵ as defined below?
12.	Yes \(\sum \) No \(\sum \)
	If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates and places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.
	SEE ATTACHMENT #3 - ProExport Colombia SEE ATTACHMENT #4 - Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al Maktoum
13.	In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of
	your foreign principals? Yes No No No No No No No No
	If yes, describe fully.

⁵ The term "political activities" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

4 . (a)	During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or mone either as compensation or otherwise? Yes No					
	If no, explain why.					
	If yes, set forth below	in the required detail and	separately for each	n foreign principal an acco	unt of such monies ⁶	
	Date	From whom	Purpose		Amount	
	SEE ATTACHMENT	ProExport Colombia	TOTAL		\$236,000.00	
	#5	Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al Maktoum	TOTAL		\$385,000.00	
					\$621,000.00	
					Total	
(b)	foreign principal name		his statement? Yestration?	of a fund raising campaign of a fund raising campaign of some of the source of the so	, any money on behalf of any	
(c)	named in Items 7, 8, a Yes \(\subseteq \text{No} \)	reporting period, have you and 9 of this statement, or			by from any foreign principal of any such foreign principal?	
	If yes, furnish the foll					
	Name of foreign principal		Description of hing of value	Purpo	ose	

^{6, 7} A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 201(e).)

⁸ An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal. 9 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a	a)	DISBURSEMENTS -	MONIES
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During this 6			

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with a	ctivity on behalf of a	ny foreign principa	al named in Items 7, 8	i, and
9 of this statement?	Yes 🗹	No 🔲		

(2)	transmitted monies to any such foreign principal?	Yes 🗌	No 🗸
Α.	i transmitted momes to any such foreign principal:	i es 🗀	140

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To whom	Purpose	Amount
ProExport Colombia 3/20/2007	Various vendors of the firm; reimbursement to employees	Office Expenses (including telephone, deliveries, transportation, periodicals, business meals, and meeting expenses)	\$125.44
4/19/2007	Various vendors of the firm; reimbursement to employees	Office Expenses (including telephone, deliveries, transportation, periodicals, business meals, and meeting expenses)	\$145.98
5/23/2007	Various vendors of the firm; reimbursement to employees	Office Expenses (including telephone, deliveries, transportation, periodicals, business meals, and meeting expenses)	\$276.15
Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al Maktoum		TOTAL - ProExport Colombia	\$547.57
3/5/2007	Various vendors of the firm; reimbursement to employees	Office Expenses (including telephone, deliveries, transportation, periodicals, business meals, meeting expenses, travel and lodging)	\$ 3,127.32
4/24/2007	Various vendors of the firm; reimbursement to employees	Office Expenses (including telephone, deliveries, transportation, periodicals, business meals, meeting expenses, travel and lodging)	\$10,366.86
5/21/2007	Various vendors of the firm; reimbursement to employees	Office Expenses (including telephone, deliveries, transportation, periodicals, business meals, meeting expenses, travel and lodging)	\$ 880.31
		TOTAL - Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al Maktoum	\$14,374.49

\$14,922.06	
Total	

(b)	During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes No					
	If yes, furnish the	following information	n:			
	Date disposed	Name of person to whom given	On behalf of what foreign principal	Description of thing of value	Purpose	
(c)	During this 6 monto other person, made or in connection w	e any contributions of	ave you from your own funds f money or other things of val ion, convention, or caucus he	lue" in connection with an	election to any political office	
	If yes, furnish the	following information	n:			
	Date	Amount or thing of value	Name of political organization	n	Name of candidate	
	SEE ATTACHMENT #6					
					1	

V-INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials 12 Yes No \(\sigma\)	?
IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN SECTION V.	
17. Identify each such foreign principal.	
ProExport Colombia	
18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes \(\sigma\) No \(\sigma\)	_
mance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials?	
If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.	
19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of information materials include the use of any of the following:	ona
☐ Radio or TV ☐ Magazine or newspaper ☐ Motion picture films ☐ Letters or telegrams broadcasts articles	
☐ Advertising campaigns ☐ Press releases ☐ Pamphlets or other publications ☐ Lectures or speeches	
☐ Internet ☐ Other (specify) Email	
	_
20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of following groups:	ihe
☐ Public Officials ☐ Newspapers ☐ Libraries	
✓ Legislators □ Editors □ Educational institutions	
☐ Government agencies ☐ Civic groups or associations ☐ Nationality groups	
Other (specify)	
21. What language was used in the informational materials:	—
✓ English	
	_
22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes \(\subseteq\) No \(\overline{\subset}\)	
SEE ATTACHED DOCUMENTS	
23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act? Yes ☑ No □	

¹² The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.

VI - EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)	(Fype or print name under each signature 13) Jeffrey J. Peck

CRN/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FARA REGISTRATION UNIT National Security Division WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOTICE

Please answer the following questions and return this sheet in triplicate with your Supplemental Statement:

1. forme			of Section V (Informational Materials – page 8 of Forental Statement):	m CRM-154,
	YES	X	or NO	
(If yo	ur answer to qu	estion 1 is "y	res" do not answer question 2 of this form.)	
2.	Do you disser	minate any m	naterial in connection with your registration:	
	YES	<u> </u>	or NO	-
films, past s	film catalogs, is months.) Frey J Peckety type or print intory on the line	posters, brock	yes" please forward for our review copies of all mater hures, press releases, etc. which you have disseminate the distance of	rial including: ed during the 207 EM 28 IM 9: 54
	Title		- -	



U.S. Department of Justice

Criminal Division

Washington, DC 20530

THIS FORM IS TO BE AN OFFICIAL ATTACHMENT TO YOUR CURRENT SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT - PLEASE EXECUTE IN TRIPLICATE

SHORT-FORM REGISTRATION INFORMATION SHEET

SECTION A

The Department records list active short-form registration statements for the following persons of your organization filed on the date indicated by each name. If a person is not still functioning in the same capacity directly on behalf of the foreign principal, please show the date of termination.

Short Form List for Registrant: Johnson, Madigan, Peck, Boland & Stewart, Inc.

Last Name	First Name and Other Names	Registration Date	Termination Date	Role	
Madigan	Peter T.	11/17/2006			
Danvers	William C.	11/17/2006			
Grissom	Janet Mullins	01/19/2007			

U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, DC 20530

SECTION B

In addition to those persons listed in Section A, list below all current employees rendering services directly on behalf of the foreign principals(s) who have not filed short-form registration statements. (Do <u>not</u> list clerks, secretaries, typists or employees in a similar or related capacity). If there is some question as to whether an employee has an obligation to file a short-form, please address a letter to the Registration Unit describing the activities and connection with the foreign principal.

Name	Function BLE	Date Hired
	Not	
Signature: Title:	Date: 627	2007 JUN 28 AN 9: 54

Q. 11 - Non-Political Activities Pro-Export Colombia 12/1/06-5/31/07

Date	Location	Sponsor	Narrative of the activities, including the purpose
		U.S. Chamber of	purpose
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
1/22/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
	3	U.S. Chamber of	agreement between the o.b. and colombia
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
1/29/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
		U.S. Chamber of	agreement between the o.o. and colombia
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
2/12/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
		U.S. Chamber of	
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
3/12/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
		U.S. Chamber of	· ·
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
3/26/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	The negotiation and approval of a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
		U.S. Chamber of	agreement between the c.o. and colombia
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
4/15/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
	8 ,	U.S. Chamber of	The negotiation and approval of a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Colombia The negotiation and approval of a free trade
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
4/12/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
	8 ,	U.S. Chamber of	agreement between the o.o. and colombia
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
4/30/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Embassy of Colombia	- Countries	agreement between the O.S. and Colombia
	Ambassador's Residence		
	1520 20 th Street, NW		Meeting with various businesses interested in
5/4/07	Washington, DC 20036	Embassy of Colombia	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement.
	Stern Beerl, 2 C 20030	U.S. Chamber of	OS Colonibia Free Frade Agreement.
	1615 H Street, NW	Commerce Business	The negotiation and approval of a free trade
5/8/07	Washington, DC 20062	Coalition	agreement between the U.S. and Colombia
5/22/07	Embassy of Colombia	Controll	Meeting with US Companies re: US Colombia
	Ambassador's Residence		Trade Promotion Agreement
	1520 20 th Street, NW	1	Trace i romocion Agreement
	Washington, DC 20036	Embassy of Colombia	

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Q. II – Non-Political Activities Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al Maktoum 12/1/06-5/31/07

Date	Location	Sponsor	Narrative of the activities, including the purpose
5/15/07	1800 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006	Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)	Briefing with His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed and His Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bib Zayed Al Nahyan of the United Arab Emirate and US foreign policy experts.
5/16/07	1615 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20062	US Chamber of Commerce	Meeting with number of that do business in the UAE, UAE Government officials and US Government officials. The purpose of the event was to announce the formation of a US-UAE Business Council.

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CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

Q,12 - Political Activities ProExport Colombia Meetings 12/1/06-5/31/07

RATION UNIT

Kind of political activity	Date of Contact	Name and Title of US Gov. official contacted	Name of media person contacted	Manner in which contact was made – phone, letter, office meeting, lunch	Description of subject matter discussed, incl the bill, resolution, treaty or agency action, by number and title, and any position advocated
Congressional Lobbying	12/4/06	Kirsten Chadwick with Minority Whip Roy Blunt	Not applicable	Office meeting	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	12/5/06	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	12/6/06	Justin McCarthy, Asst. US Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	12/6/06	Leadership Staff, Rep. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	12/7/06	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative and Justin McCarthy, Asst. US Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs, USTR,	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	1/9/07	Justin McCarthy, Asst. US Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	1/26/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative and Justin McCarthy, Asst. US Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs, USTR,	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	1/29/07	Sen. Mitch McConnell	Not applicable	Lunch	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	2/19/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement

Congressional Lobbying	2/26/07	Justin McCarthy, Asst. US Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	3/20/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative and Justin McCarthy, Asst. US Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs, USTR,	Not applicable	Phone call	Visit of Colombian Foreign Minister Plata
Congressional Lobbying	3/20/07	Mike Stokke, Chief of Staff, Rep. Dennis Hastert	Not applicable	Phone call	Visit of Colombian Foreign Minister Plata
Congressional Lobbying	3/27/07	Sarah Ellis, Deputy Assistant USTR – Congressional Affairs	Not applicable	Lunch meeting	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	3/29/07	Business Whip Coalition - Rep. Roy Blunt and Rep. Eric Cantor	Not applicable	Office meeting	Trade agenda for Colombia
Congressional Lobbying	4/5/07	Ian Campbell – Chief of Staff - Rep. Yvette Clarke	Not applicable	Office meeting	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/17/07	Simon Limage, Deputy Chief of Staff and Marin Larson (Office of Rep. Ellen Tauscher) and Matt Schumaker, New Democratic Coalition	Not applicable	Office meeting	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/17/07	Kimberly Thompson, Legislative Director, Rep. Kevin Brady	Not applicable	Phone call	Visit of Colombian Foreign Minister Plata
Congressional Lobbying	4/18/07	Kimberly Thompson, Legislative Director, Rep. Kevin Brady	Not applicable	Phone call	Visit of Colombian Foreign Minister Plata
Congressional Lobbying	4/18/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	Upcoming visit of President Uribe of Colombia
Congressional Lobbying	4/19/07	Rep. Joe Crowley	Not applicable	Office meeting	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/19/07	House New Democrats Coalition	Not applicable	Office meeting	Free Trade Agreements for Colombia, Peru and Panama
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Brian Diffell, Policy Analyst, Rep. Roy Blunt	Not applicable	Phone call	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe

Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Sam Lancaster, Scheduler, Rep. Dennis Hastert	Not applicable	Phone call	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	David Ransom, Senior Communications & Policy Advisor and Mariah Sixkiller, Policy Advisor, Rep. Steny Hoyer	Not applicable	Phone call	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	David Ransom, Senior Communications & Policy Advisor, Gina Mahoney and Mariah Sixkiller, Policy Advisor, Rep. Steny Hoyer	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Miles Lackey, Senior Advisor, House Rules Committee	Not applicable	Office meeting	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Miles Lackey, Senior Advisor, House Rules Committee	Not applicable	Email	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Peter Quilter, House Foreign Affairs Committee	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director, House Foreign Affairs Committee	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Sophia King, Legislative Director, Rep. Gregory Meeks	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Michael Torra, Chief of Staff, Rep. Linda Sanchez	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Gabriel Trevino, Legislative Assistant, Rep. Albio Sircs	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Mira Kogen, Legislative Assistant, Rep. Ron Klein	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Mark Walker, House Foreign Affairs Committee	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	4/24/07	Randy Duvalk, Senior Policy Advisor, Sen. Harry Reid	Not applicable	Office meeting	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe

Congressional Lobbying	4/30/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe
Congressional Lobbying	5/1/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	Upcoming visit of Colombian President Uribe
Congressional Lobbying	5/1/07	Rep. Kevin Brady, US House of Representatives	Not applicable	Office meeting	Visit of Colombian Foreign Minister Plata and US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/1/07	Brett Boyles, Chief of Staff, Sen. Trent Lott	Not applicable	Phone call	Visit of Colombian President Uribe w/Senator Lott
Congressional Lobbying	5/2/07	Sen. Trent Lott	Not applicable	Office meeting	Visit w/Colombian President Uribe and US Colombian Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/3/07	Tim Reif, Chief Trade Counsel, House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Trade	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/3/07	Rep. Roy Blunt	Not applicable	Office meeting	Visit w/Colombian President Uribe re US Colombian Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/3/07	Rep. David Dreier	Not applicable	Office meeting	Visit w/Colombian President Uribe re US Colombian Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/3/07	Rep. Dan Burton	Not applicable	Office meeting	Visit w/Colombian President Uribe re US Colombian Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/3/07	Rep. Tim McCrery	Not applicable	Office meeting	Visit w/Colombian President Uribe re US Colombian Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/4/07	Rich Verma, Senior National Security Affairs Advisor, Sen. Harry Reid	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/4/07	Mariah Sixkiller, Policy Advisor, Rep. Steny Hoyer	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional	5/6/07	Demetrios J. Marantis, Chief International Trade Counsel, Committee on Finance	Not applicable	Email	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/7/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/8/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement

Congressional Lobbying	5/9/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/15/07	Dominic Ngyuen, Legislative Assistant, Rep. Patrick Kennedy	Not applicable	Office meeting	Plan Colombia and the US- Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/23/07	Rich Verma, Senior National Security Affairs Advisor, Sen. Harry Reid	Not applicable	Office meeting	Plan Colombia and the US- Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/24/07	Mike Harney, and Dominic Ngyuen, Legislative Assistants, Rep. Patrick Kennedy	Not applicable	Office meeting	Plan Colombia and the US- Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/24/07	Shelly Stoneman, Legislative Director, Rep. Steven R. Rothman	Not applicable	Phone call	Plan Colombia
Congressional Lobbying	5/25/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US Colombia Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/30/07	Mike Castellano, Trade Policy Counsel, Sen. Harry Reid	Not applicable	Phone call	Andean Trade Preference Act

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Q.12 – Political Activities Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Meetings 12/1/06-5/31/07

Kind of political activity	Date of Contact	Name and Title of US Gov. official contacted	Name of media person contacted	Manner in which contact was made – phone, letter, office meeting, lunch	Description of subject matter discussed, incl the bill, resolution, treaty or agency action, by number and title, and any position advocated
Congressional Lobbying	1/22/07	Christopher Padilla, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce	Not applicable	Phone call	United Arab Emirate Export Control Laws
Congressional Lobbing	2/1/07	David McCormick, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs, The White House	Not applicable	Phone call	Visit of Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi
Congressional Lobbying	2/2/07	Dr. Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, US State Department	Not applicable	Phone call	Dubai human rights and labor
Congressional Lobbying	2/8/07	Jeffrey Krilla, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US State Department	Not applicable	Phone call	State Department Human Rights Report on Dubai
Congressional Lobbying	2/12/07	Randy Fort, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US State Department	Not applicable	Lunch	General impressions of Dubai
Congressional Lobbying	2/21/07	Mike Kostiw, Senate Armed Services Committee	Not applicable	Office meeting	General discussion of the US-Dubai relationship and the strategic importance of the relationship between the two countries.
Congressional Lobbying	3/5/07	Jeffrey Krilla, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US State Department	Not applicable	Phone call	Dubai human rights issues
Congressional Lobbying	3/9/07	Paul Grove, Senate Appropriations Committee	Not applicable	Office meeting	General discussion of the US-Dubai relationship and the strategic importance of the relationship between the two countries.

Congressional Lobbying	3/12/07	David McCormick, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs, The White House	Not applicable	Phone call	Visit of Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi
Congressional Lobbying	3/26/07	Cong. Peter King, U.S. House of Representatives	Not applicable	Lunch meeting	General discussion of Dubai Ports, and the pending financial transactions that are subject to CIFIUS.
Congressional Lobbying	3/29/07	Sarah Ellis, Deputy Assistant USTrade Representative, Congressional Affairs, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	TECOM Investment/US-UAE Free Trade Agreement negotiations
Congressional Lobbying	4/6/07	Christopher Padilla, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce	Not applicable	Phone call	United Arab Emirate Export Control Laws
Congressional Lobbying	4/17/07	Simon Limage, Chief of Staff and Marin Larson (Rep. Ellen Tauscher) and Matt Schumaker, New Democratic Coalition	Not applicable	Office meeting	US-Dubai/UAE relations.
Congressional Lobbying	4/20/07	Christopher Padilla, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce	Not applicable	Phone call	United Arab Emirate Export Control Laws
Congressional Lobbying	5/7/07	Christopher Padilla, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce	Not applicable	Phone call	United Arab Emirate Export Control Laws
Congressional Lobbying	5/15/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US-UAE Free Trade Agreement
Congressional Lobbying	5/17/07	John Veroneau, Deputy US Trade Representative, USTR	Not applicable	Phone call	US-UAE Free Trade Agreement

Congressional	5/21/07	John Veroneau,	Not	Office meeting	US-UAE Free Trade Agreement
Lobbying		Deputy US Trade	applicable		
		Representative,			
		USTR and Justin			
		McCarthy, Asst. US			
	i	Trade			
		Representative for			
		Congressional			
		Affairs, USTR			
Congressional	5/23/07	John Veroneau,	Not	Phone call	US-UAE Free Trade Agreement
Lobbying		Deputy US Trade	applicable		
		Representative,			
		USTR			

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Answer to Q. 14 (a) Receipts-Monies

Set forth below are the details separately for the ProExport Colombia and the Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al of monies received for the period 12/1/06-5/31/07.

ProExport Colombia:

Date	From Whom	Purpose	Amount
12/20/06	Export Promotion Trust Fund, Embassy of Colombia	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$51,000.00
3/20/07	Export Promotion Trust Fund, Embassy of Colombia	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$37,000.00
4/19/07	Export Promotion Trust Fund, Embassy of Colombia	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$37,000.00
4/19/07	Export Promotion Trust Fund, Embassy of Colombia	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$37,000.00
5/23/07	Export Promotion Trust Fund, Embassy of Colombia	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$74,000.00
		Total	\$236,000.00

Executive Office of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashad Al:

Date	From Whom	Purpose	Amount
3/5/07	DLA Piper US LLP	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$105,000.00
4/24/07	DLA Piper US LLP	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$210,000.00
5/21/07	DLA Piper US LLP	Fees for services rendered and expense reimbursement	\$ 70,000
		Total	\$385,000.00

Political Contributions 12/1/06-5/31/07

<u>Contributor</u>	<u>Date</u>	Amount	Name of Political Organization	Name of Candidate
Bill Danvers	12/7/2006	\$250.00	Melissa Bean for Congress	Melissa Bean
Bill Danvers	12/7/2006		Baron Hill for Congress	Baron Hill
Bill Danvers	4/25/2007		All America PAC	Evan Bayh
Bill Danvers	5/9/2007	\$250.00	Lynch for Congress	Stephen Lynch
Bill Danvers	5/23/2007		Leahy for Vermont	Patrick Leahy
Peter Madigan	12/18/2006	\$2,100.00	The Exploratory Committee	John McCain
Peter Madigan	1/29/2007	\$2,000.00	McConnell Senate Committee	Mitch McConnell
Peter Madigan	2/21/2007	\$4,600.00	Collins for Senator	Susan Collins
Peter Madigan	2/28/2007	\$1,000.00	First State PAC	Tom Carper
Peter Madigan	4/17/2007	\$4,600.00	Team Sununu	John Sununu
Peter Madigan	5/9/2007	\$1,000.00	Trent Lott for Mississippi	Trent Lott
Peter Madigan	5/10/2007	\$5,000.00	Straight Talk America PAC	John McCain
Janet Mullins Grissom	1/29/2007	\$2,300.00 1	McConnell for Senate	Mitch McConnell
Janet Mullins Grissom	2/2/2007	\$1,000.00	Coleman for Senate	Norm Coleman
Janet Mullins Grissom	3/7/2007	\$500.00 1	Eric PAC	Eric Cantor
Janet Mullins Grissom	3/15/2007	\$2,300.00 1	McCain 2008	John McCain
Janet Mullins Grissom	3/18/2007	\$5,000.00 1	McConnell Majority Committee	Mitch McConnell
Janet Mullins Grissom	3/26/2007		Pete King for Congress	Pete King
Janet Mullins Grissom	3/28/2007	\$1,000.00 1	Northup/Hoover (Gubernatorial)	Anne Northup
Janet Mullins Grissom	4/17/2007		Team Sununu	John Sununu

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ProExport Colombia Documents Disseminated

White Paper PowerPoint Myths and Facts About Accusations Against President Álvaro Uribe

Plan Colombia: A Bipartisan Success Story

Presentation Colombia

Embajada de Colombia

Communique Flyer

Plan Colombia: A Bipartisan Success Story

The Economist

America and Colombia - How to boost the coca crop

article

Help Colombia - Álvaro Uribe Gets Blamed for the Success of His Own

Washington Post article

Reform

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Myths and Facts About Accusations Against President Álvaro Uribe

During a debate in Colombia's Congress on April 17th, one of President Alvaro Uribe's staunchest political adversaries, Senator and former guerrilla member Gustavo Petro, from the left-wing Polo Democrático political party, made serious allegations against the President regarding his ties to paramilitary groups. Those allegations are false. Below are some of the accusations made against President Uribe by Senator Petro, and the truth behind them.

Myth: Senator Petro stated that in the mid 1980's paramilitary leaders met in the President's farm to plot the murder of several opponents.

Fact: There was a murder on the Uribe ranch in 1983, but the victim was the President's father. During this episode, the FARC Marxist guerrillas also wounded his brother, Santiago Uribe, and attempted to kidnap his sister Maria Isabel Uribe. The ranch, originally purchased in 1977, was attacked again by the same guerrillas in 1986, who burned the house and killed the ranch's administrator. The Uribes sold the ranch in July 1996 after several years of being unoccupied and no longer being used by the family.

The alleged paramilitary activity claimed by Petro that was supposedly conducted from the Uribe ranch is false. The President did not occupy the ranch at the time it was alleged to have been used by the paramilitaries. The April 23rd edition of *Semana*, Colombia's leading news magazine, stated in an analysis of these charges that "none of these accusations incriminate the President directly, and the evidence provided by Petro is insufficient".

Myth: Senator Petro also accused the President's brother, Santiago Uribe, of involvement with paramilitary groups.

Fact: Santiago Uribe voluntarily testified before the Justice system in 1986, and no charges have been brought against him.

Johnson Madigan Peck is a registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and has distributed these materials on behalf of the Government of Colombia. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Myth: Senator Petro stated that Governor Uribe knowingly authorized civilians who later became paramilitary leaders to create 13 Convivir organizations.

Fact: The formation of Convivir organizations was allowed pursuant to law in 1993 as legal private security groups, under public force's supervision, to counter illegally- armed groups that were then rampant. Senator Petro specifically referred to a number of cases in which the Convivir years later morphed into paramilitary operations. Of these, one Convivir never received governmental authorization, and eight were cancelled by then-Governor Uribe because of questions surrounding their operations. Four others mentioned by the Senator were located outside the Governor's state of Antioquia, and therefore were not under Uribe's jurisdiction.

Myth: Senator Petro alleged that a State Government helicopter flew over the zone where a paramilitary massacre was taking place during President Uribe's tenure as Governor.

Fact: The state of Antioquia owned two helicopters when the Aro massacre took place: a medical helicopter and another for the use of the Governor. There is no evidence that either of these helicopters was in the area. The *Semana* article referenced above concluded that this allegation is ludicrous.

The Truth About Colombia

In his five years in office, President Álvaro Uribe has instituted a series of reforms, initiatives and policies to move Colombia towards peace, security and prosperity. His Government has fostered an era of increasing civil tranquility and economic expansion. All of these efforts have been made in the context of transparent, democratic governance —a commitment President Uribe maintains vigilantly. President Uribe has earned unprecedented popularity levels among Colombians for his leadership in democratic reforms, combating drug trafficking and drug-related violence, increasing security and encouraging economic development.

In the midst of the government led demobilization process, progress on the economic, security and social investment fronts offer millions of Colombians a chance at a better life. In the words of the March 16th editorial of *The Washington Post*, "Mr. Uribe is immensely popular in Colombia because he has greatly reduced homicides and

kidnappings while overseeing rapid economic growth". The President's popularity at home remains undaunted by his opponents' attacks.


The revelations about the links between politicians and paramilitaries, which are being investigated by the judicial system, are "paradoxically", as was said by *The Economist* on February 22nd, "a result of one of Mr. Uribe's successes. He persuaded the 30,000 paramilitaries to demobilize. Some of their leaders are now testifying about their past acts."

In its March 24th edition, *The Economist* concluded that because of President Uribe's demobilization policy, the Colombian President deserves U. S. support. "After four years in which he transformed his country, Alvaro Uribe is running into problems. Some of them are symptoms of success."

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PLAN COLOMBIA: A BIPARTISAN SUCCESS STORY



Libertad y Orden

Ministry of Defense Republic of Colombia



- 1. The Plan Colombia: Why it has been successful?
 - Progress against drug trafficking and terrorism
 - Strengthening of human rights
 - Social and economic development
- 2. The new bilateral cooperation under a comprehensive strategy
- 3. A reduction imperils our mutual success
- 4. Conclusions

The Plan Colombia: Why it has been successful?

Areas of bilateral support for security


- Sustainability of military and police operations against narco-terrorism
- Reestablishment of military and police presence in all municipalities
- Strengthening of:
 - Eradication Program
 - Air, maritime, riverine and land interdiction capabilities
 - Air medical evacuation capacities
 - Intelligence and communications

Improvement of:

- Infrastructure for the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism
- Air mobility
- The logistics sinergy system (SILOG)


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Hectares of Coca Crops in Colombia



The Colombian Government signed an agreement with SIMCI (Monitoring System of Illicit Crops) and as such is the official data for illicit crop detection in Colombia. / *This estimate is still being revised by the UNODC. /Source: Dirección Antinarcóticos PONAL; Dirección Nal Estupefacientes, Department of State U.S.; SIMCI, June 2006.


Poppy Crops



We are helping Afghanistan thanks to our successful results.

Source: Sistema de Información de Drogas de Colombia, Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia. January 30, 2007.


Increase in tons of cocaine seized



Since 2000 768,9 tons of cocaine, with an estimated value of US\$ 20.3 billion, have been seized.

Source: Comando General FF.MM y Centro de Investigaciones Criminológicas de la Policía Nacional.

Seizure of precursors and chemicals




These materials are primarily imported from developed countries

Source: Dirección de Antinarcóticos PONAL; Comando General FF.MM. May 2007

Sprayed hectares of coca crops


Manual eradication of coca crops



Source: Dirección de Antinarcóticos PONAL; Comando General FF.MM. May 2007 Source: Sistema de Información de Drogas de Colombia, Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia. January 30, 2007

Number of laboratories destroyed

Approved extraditions



Source: Armed Forces General Command and National Police Center for Criminal Investigation.

Source: Minister of Justice, January 2007

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Hypothesis: Why coca price might be decreasing?

Demand side:


· Consumption increase of methamphetamines and amphetamines (substitute goods).

Supply side:


- Marketing strategy to capture new young consumers (loss leader).
- New cocaine producers in the market (other than Colombia).
- Reduction of quality and purity.

A deeper study of the market is necessary. It is clear that Colombia has made progress in all the indicators it is responsible for the fight against terrorism and narcotrafficking.

Attacks to towns





Terrorist Actions




Attacks to oil pipelines


Source 1: Observatorio de DDHH y DIH, Vicepresidencia de la República y CIC. / Source 2: CGFM, CIC, ISA ECOPETROL / Source 3: ECOPETROL, May 2007.







Mayors Threatened and forced to Leave their Municipalities




Source 1: CIC – DIJIN Policía Nacional - April de 2007. / Source 2: FONDELIBERTAD, April of 2007. / Source 3: Federación Nacional de Municipios.


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The Plan Colombia: Why it has been successful? Strengthening of human rights

Reduction in the number of cases and victims of massacres




Reduction in the number of teachers and journalists murdered




Reduction in the murder of indigenous peoples and trade unionists

Source 1: Centro de Investigaciones Criminológicas de la Policía Nacional. / Source 2 and 3: Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de DDHH y DIH, Vicepresidencia de la República.




The Plan Colombia: Why it has been successful? Strengthening of human rights


Human Rights complaints (to a Civilian Ombudsman) as a % of active duty Military and Policemen



Source 1: Procuraduría General de la Nación – Comando General FF.MM.


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


Source 1: DNP - Departamento Nacional de Planeación.

Economic growth and security




Unemployment Rate



Source 1: DANE

National Poverty Rate




^{*} World Bank and IADB supported / ** Economic Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean

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
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The new bilateral cooperation under a comprehensive strategy



The new bilateral cooperation under a comprehensive strategy

US Cooperation is under a comprehensive strategy for the democratic and social strengthening of the country




This strategy assumes an additional support from the international community in order to achieve its goals.

* Colombian counterpart resources allocated to accompany additional support from the international community.



Colombian Proposal

The Colombian Government has a plan to assume higher responsibilities by acquiring technical, logistic, and administrative capabilities, and gradually assume responsibility for the personnel expenditures in the programs supported by the United States Government.





The new bilateral cooperation under a comprehensive strategy

Structure of the Colombian Plan to assume more responsibilities

PHASE 1 Analysis

PHASE 2 Capacity building

PHASE 3 Responsibility for personnel costs

Analysis of personnel costs

Analysis of current technical, logistical, and administrative

capabilities

Technical

- · Training
- · Warrant Officer

Logistics

- · 81100
- · CNIMC

Administrative Redesign the MDN Leadership Special Pro. Pilots, technicians, administrative personnel

United States Mongalus

- · Fuel
- Maintenance
- · Logisties

Programs

Eradication

PONAL Aviation Army Aviation


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A reduction imperils our mutual success

Resources for financing the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism Democratic Security Consolidation Policy (DSCP)

Resources 2007 - 2010




^{**}Expected resources from bilateral cooperation that are crucial at this decisive stage in Colombia's internal confrontation.

All these resources are a fundamental complement for attaining DSCP objectives.


A reduction imperils our mutual success

In Colombia security investment has become the most important social impact effort.





Implication of the reduction of bilateral cooperation



A reduction in bilateral cooperation will negatively affect the DSCP.



Implication of the reduction of bilateral cooperation

Reduction of bilateral cooperation



National budget reallocation



DS

CP

Planned capabilities at risk

- Mobility for the Public Force (currently the Army counts with 34 heavy helicopters for a manpower force of 212,000 men).
- Increase manpower by 37,000 men.
- Reach 70% in national coverage in air interdiction, air support and air escort.
- Grow from 30% to 70% of maritime surveillance capability.
- Increse riverine control, which currently covers 50% of the territory.
- Strengthening of intelligence and communications.

Consequences

- Increase of drug trafficking and terrorism
- Crime increase in the US
- Social and economic setback in Colombia



A reduction imperils our mutual success

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If the US reduces its cooperation for Interdiction and Eradication We won't be able to:

Fully operate eradication aircraft (fuel, maintenance and crew)



- Spray 50,000 ha in 2008
- Spray 95,000 ha in 2009
- Spray in 2010 at all

IMPLICATIONS

Production of 731 tons of cocaine

Increase of drug supply and terrorism

Ecocide

US\$18 bn for traffickers and terrorists

Less destruction of cocaine labs

Displaced Population and emigration


Increase in crime and deterioration of public health in U.S cities and poor neighborhoods



A reduction imperils our mutual success

If the US reduces its cooperation for Interdiction Operation (COLAR) and Infrastructure Protection (COLAR), we won't be able to:

Fully operate rotatory wing and fixed wing



- 3,200 combat missions / year
- 2,300 combat support missions/ year
- · 350 combat service support missions/ year
- 180 aeromedical evacuation mission/ year
- Reduce the vulnerability of the oil pipeline



IMPLICATIONS

No support for Police eradication programs

Less drug related arrests

Less destruction of cocaine labs

Increase of infrastructure terrorist attacks (oil pipelines)- may cause an energy crisis

Unable to dismantle criminal organizations

Increase in crime and deterioration of public health in U.S cities and poor neighborhoods

Weakening the support to Colombia which is a strong ally to the US, could undermine regional stability and US interests.


- 1. The Plan Colombia: Why it has been successful?
 - Progress against drug trafficking and terrorism
 - Strengthening of human rights
 - Social and economic development
- 2. The new bilateral cooperation under a comprehensive strategy
- 3. A reduction imperils our mutual success
- 4. Conclusions



- Success in Colombia is the result of the political will of Colombians and the US bipartisan support.
- It is not the appropriate time to weaken our investment in security.
 It might result in a set back on social development and democratic progress in Colombia.
- Drug trafficking continues to provide enormous resources to terrorists.
 Pressure cannot diminish. Actions against drug trafficking should be strengthened and extended to all the links in the chain.
- US cities still vulnerable to drug trafficking from Colombia. Any reduction to the bilateral cooperation to fight narco-terrorism, would imply a negative impact to the health and security of US cities.



- If security conditions are not set, social investment is sterile. Civil state institutions will be pressured and co-opted by the illegal armed groups.
- Social investment done in areas where state territorial control is not consolidated, and as a consequence there is influence of illegal armed groups, it will only serve to legitimize them and make their financing, liberty of action and their control over the population much easier.
- Security, is the most sought after public service of the Colombian population. Where there is no guarantee to protect population and the right to life, there is no possibility of welfare and development.
- Colombia is the United States' most important strategic partner in the region.



Libertad y Orden

EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

Washington, D.C.

Regarding the recent news reports about Colombia that have appeared in various newsmedia, the Embassy of Colombia issues the following statement:

First, with respect to the accusations of wire-tapping by the Police Intelligence
Unit:

Last Sunday, Colombian newsweekly *Semana* published an article reporting on detainee telephone calls being intercepted. President Alvaro Uribe immediately launched an investigation that established that members of the Colombian National Police were intercepting telephone calls, not only of prisoners, but also of members of the Government, the opposition party, and the press. The Director of the National Police, General Jorge Castro, and the Director of the Intelligence Unit, General Guillermo Chavez, resigned and President Uribe immediately appointed General Oscar Naranjo as Director of the National Police. General Naranjo has a distinguished record of working alongside U.S. counter-narcotic and intelligence agencies to combat the trafficking of illegal drugs. The Attorney General's Office is carrying on the investigations of these illegal proceedings.

Secondly, with respect to the deposition made by paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso:

Last Monday, one of the heads of the paramilitaries, Salvatore Mancuso, who is under arrest and has begun his testimony in compliance with the procedures offered by the Law of Justice and Peace, stated that during the tenure of President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) the current Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, plotted with Mancuso and his fellow paramilitary chief, Carlos Castaño, to overthrow the President in a "type of coup d'etat." The Defense Minister has rejected these accusations and explained in a communiqué that he met twice with Carlos Castaño: the first time, joined by iournalist Germán Santamaría, and the second time by former Senator Alvaro Leyva to discuss a possible peace process with paramilitary groups. In this process, explained Minister Santos, there were several high-level individuals involved, including former President Belisario Betancur. These meetings, which took place in 1997, were made public many years ago. President Uribe has expressed his support for the Defense Minister. Mancuso also stated in his testimony that a meeting took place between Carlos Santos, in which the Vice President was briefed on the way in which a paramilitary group operated in a certain part of the country. Mancuso alleges that during this meeting Santos expressed his desire to replicate the model in Bogotá, the Colombian capital.

Johnson Madigan Peck is a registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and has distributed these materials on behalf of the Government of Colombia. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Vice President Santos immediately requested the Attorney General of Colombia to open an investigation about the subject. The Vicepresident added that he met with Mancuso two times as a journalist (he was the Managing Editor of El Tiempo). The first meeting took place in the province of Córdoba in the mid 90's when Carlos Castaño invited the Vicepresident to talk about Colombia's political situation. Mancuso was present. The second meeting was held in the offices of El Tiempo in Bogotá. Some editors of the newspaper were present. In those days there were no charges against Mancuso. The changes in the leadership of the National Police, and the statements issued by Vice President Santos and the Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, reflect the Government of Colombia's ongoing commitment to transparency, the rule of law, and the fight against crime.

PLAN COLOMBIA: A BIPARTISAN SUCCESS STORY

CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

1. PLAN COLOMBIA WAS STARTED BY THE UNITED STATES AS A BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO RESCUE COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRACY

"..."Plan Colombia" - a comprehensive plan to seek peace, fight drugs, build the economy, and deepen democracy. The legislation I signed today represents America's contribution to the struggle...As Colombians fight to build their democracy and block the illegal drug trade, they are fighting for all of us. If they are willing to take up the fight, we should be willing to take on some of the cost. I am proud to sign legislation that commits us to doing that." President Bill Clinton, July 13, 2000 - Washington DC

- ✓ In May 2000, 386 Democrats and Republicans in the HOUSE and 96 Democrats and Republicans in the SENATE supported Plan Colombia
- ✓ Plan Colombia is one of the most successful initiatives in US Foreign Policy in recent years
- ✓ Colombia was almost a failed state. In 2000, there were 73 Homicides, 8 Kidnappings, and 4 Terrorist Attacks EVERY DAY in Colombia

2. WHY PLAN COLOMBIA HAS BEEN SUCCESFUL Progress made against drug trafficking and terrorism

- ✓ Hectares of coca crops decreased from 160,000 in 1998 to 78,260 in 2006 according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
- ✓ Almost the end of heroin trafficking as a business in Colombia
- √ 768.9 tons of cocaine seized, \$20 USD billion worth did not reach the streets of NY, Miami, LA and other American cities since 2000
- \checkmark 145 persons extradited to the U.S. in 2006 (638 from 2000 to date)
- √ 60% decrease in terrorist actions (1,549 in 2000 vs. 646 in 2006)
- \checkmark 50% decrease in homicide rate (from 63 per 10,000 inhabitants in 2000 to 37per 10,000)
- √ 90% reduction in kidnapping since 2000 (2,889 in 2000 vs. 282 in 2006)
- ✓ The return of mayors and Police to all Colombian municipalities

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Strengthening of Human Rights

- ✓ Reduction in the number of cases of massacres from 1,403 in 2000 to 193 in 2006
- ✓ 80% decrease in homicides to unionists (123 in 2001 vs. 23 in 2006)
- √ 75% less homicides to indigenous people (181 in 2001 vs. 44 in 2006)
- √ 40% reduction in murders of teachers (97 in 2002 vs. 56 in 2006)
- ✓ 70% less homicides to journalists (11 in 2002 vs. 3 in 2006)
- ✓ Low human rights complaints to a Civilian Ombudsman (0.35% of the active duty Military and Policemen in 2006)

Social and economic development

- ✓ GDP growth: 1,93% in 2002 vs. 6,80% in 2006
- ✓ Colombia is now one of the most attractive emerging markets in the World for FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)
- ✓ Evident negative correlation between economic growth and security
- ✓ Low and controlled inflation rate (4.48% in 2006)
- ✓ Decreasing trend of unemployment rate (from 16.4 % in 2002 to 11.4% in 2006)
- ✓ A drastic reduction in national poverty rate from 56% in 2002 to 45% in 2006

3. COLOMBIA AND THE U.S. MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO CONSOLIDATE RESULTS

- ✓ U.S. cooperation is part of a comprehensive strategy for the democratic and social strengthening of the country. It includes the following components and counterpart resources from Colombia:
 - o Fight against drug trafficking and terrorism (\$ 6.2 USD billion)
 - o Strengthening of human rights and justice (\$ 2.7 USD billion)
 - o Trade and economic integration (\$ 12 USD billion)
 - o Social programs (\$ 20.7 USD billion)
 - Comprehensive attention to the displaced population(\$ 1.2 USD billion)
 - Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) (\$ 1 USD billion)
- ✓ Colombia is expecting \$ 1.8 USD billion from the U.S. to support the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism for the period 2007 2010

- ✓ Resources from the U.S. are crucial at this decisive stage in Colombia's internal confrontation
- ✓ Security investment (joint effort) has become the most important social impact effort. In 2002 for \$ 1 USD invested in security, Colombia invested \$ 1.4 USD in social programs. In 2006 for \$ 1 USD invested in security, Colombia invested \$ 1.6 USD in social programs.
- ✓ Colombia has a plan to assume higher responsibilities by acquiring technical, logistic, and administrative capabilities, and gradually assume the personnel expenditures in the joint programs. It will generate savings to the U.S. without affecting the scope of the programs.

4. A REDUCTION IMPERILS OUR MUTUAL SUCCES

- ✓ Any decrease in the amount of the U.S. cooperation for the drug trafficking and terrorism would disrupt the scope of the Democratic Security Consolidation Policy (DSCP)
- ✓ A reduction in U.S. cooperation would imply a budgetary reallocation that would put at risk planned capabilities with high impact:
 - o Mobility for the military standing force (now just 34 helicopters for 212,000 men)
 - o Increase manpower by 37,000 men
 - Reach 70% in national coverage, air interdiction, support and escort
 - o Grow from 30% to 70% the maritime surveillance capabilities
 - o Increase riverine control, which currently covers 50% of territory
 - Strengthening intelligence and communications
- ✓ If the U.S. reduces its cooperation, Colombia won't be able to:
 - o Fully operate eradication aircraft (fuel, maintenance an crew)
 - Spray 50,000 ha in 2008 (123552.690 acres)
 - Spray 95,000 ha in 2009 (234750.112 acres)
 - Spray in 2010 at all
 - o Fully operate rotary wing and fixed wing
 - 30% less combat missions / year

This implies:

- Production of 731 tons of cocaine
- Increase of drug supply and terrorism

- o Less drug related arrests
- o Less destruction of cocaine labs
- o Increase in terrorist attacks, particularly against oil infrastructure
- Less capabilities to dismantle criminal organizations
- o Displaced population and emigration
- o Increase in crime and deterioration of public health in U.S. cities and poor neighborhoods
- o Social and economic setback in Colombia
- ✓ Weakening the support to Colombia, which is a strong ally to the U.S., could undermine regional stability and our mutual interests.

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
America and Colombia

How to boost the coca crop

Mar 22nd 2007 From The Economist print edition 2007 JUN 28 MM 9: 59 CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

If the Democrats turn against Colombia's president, they will damage American interests

THE United States, it is said with some justification, has neglected Latin America. But there is one big exception: Colombia. Since 1999, first under Bill Clinton and then under George Bush, it has given some \$4.5 billion under the guise of Plan Colombia, a scheme to fight drug trafficking and guerrillas. That amounts to the biggest aid commitment outside the Middle East and Afghanistan. It has been possible because both parties supported the idea of backing Colombia's embattled democracy. But that consensus may now be crumbling—just when the policy seems to be working fairly well.



There are two reasons why the Democrats now in control of Congress have become increasingly queasy. The biggest one is Colombia's combative president, Álvaro Uribe. Recent revelations have linked several of his supporters and a former senior official to right-wing paramilitary militias. The country's Supreme Court has ordered the arrest of nine legislators who support Mr Uribe and who are accused of such links. Most shocking is the case of Jorge Noguera, whom Mr Uribe appointed as head of the state intelligence service. He is accused of having collaborated with the paramilitaries, to the extent of providing lists of trade unionists who were later murdered because of their alleged links to left-wing guerrillas. These revelations come as a controversial peace process under which some 30,000 paramilitaries gave up their weapons risks unravelling. Several thousand of the militiamen, it is feared, have returned to arms and to crime.

For Mr Uribe's opponents, these troubling stories are proof that the president is in league with the paramilitaries. He certainly has faults, one of which is his sometimes poor choice of collaborators. But his vigorous opposition to the left-wing guerrillas who have plagued his country is combined with a commitment to a democratic system he has done much to strengthen (see article). He has, for instance, given full backing to the judicial investigations into paramilitary infiltration of the state.

If Mr Uribe keeps bad company, it is the result of an instinctive reluctance to leave any political space to his right. Yet it is this tactic that has enabled him to convince the paramilitaries to disarm and face justice.

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Their demobilisation has been full of improvisation and imperfections. But the process has acquired a momentum of its own that offers a path towards peace and the strengthening of the rule of law. Putting the paramilitary leaders on trial, combating any of their followers who return to violence and helping the rest to adopt civilian lives would be complicated in a far more developed country. In Colombia, it is conceivable only in the climate of greater security that Mr Uribe has created.

Stop spraying coca but don't stint on security

The Democrats' second criticism is that Plan Colombia focuses too much on military aid and drug-fighting and too little on development. There's something in that. But Colombia is still under assault from the guerrillas and other drug traffickers. It is naive to think that human rights can be protected and the countryside developed in an atmosphere of violence.

Lasting security, admittedly, cannot be achieved by military means alone. Still less can the country be made safe and prosperous by the policy of spraying weedkiller on coca crops—a futile exercise that has failed to staunch the flow of cocaine to the United States and has alienated large numbers of peasants. So Mr Uribe should combine his emphasis on security with other policies, such as rural development and strengthening the rule of law. Indeed, his government should risk being even more radical. Colombia is in urgent need of land reform and now has an unparalleled opportunity to introduce it: hundreds of thousands of people displaced by rural violence could be settled on land confiscated from paramilitaries and drug traffickers.

The Democrats who are fed up with Mr Uribe are thinking of blocking a pending free-trade agreement with Colombia. They do not much like free trade anyway (which is why they may also block an agreement with Peru). But although they may find protectionist arguments seductive, they should look to their country's wider interests. Blocking these deals would send a powerful message to Latin Americans to give up on the United States and trust instead in the bountiful aid offered by Venezuela's oil-rich demagogue, Hugo Chávez. And hampering the free movement of goods would discourage Colombian farmers from diversifying away from coca and into legal crops. Cocaine, after all, does not face tariffs

Help Colombia

Álvaro Uribe gets blamed for the success of his own reforms.

Thursday, March 15, 2007; A18

CRM/ISS/REGISTRAI MUCH OF President Bush's tour of Latin America was haunted by what his administration has failed to accomplish during the past six years. In Brazil, the shadow ?? was the absence of progress on trade between the United States and Latin America's: largest country; in Mexico, the absence of immigration reform. The mood of the president's stop in the third-largest country on his tour, Colombia, was somber, too -- but, oddly enough, because of his policy's success, not its failure.

Since the beginning of this decade the United States has invested nearly \$5 billion in Plan Colombia, a broad attempt to reduce drug trafficking and violence through military aid, economic development and drug eradication. From the beginning, skeptics in Congress have grumbled that the program was too focused on military measures and that it did not go after the right-wing paramilitary groups that were often linked to the military.

Now, at last, the paramilitary network in Colombia and its military and political alliances are being exposed and uprooted. Last year some 30,000 members of the right-wing groups demobilized under an agreement with the Colombian government; their leaders have been imprisoned and are testifying about their activities in exchange for reduced sentences. This flood of information, combined with parallel investigations by the supreme court and attorney general, has led to the arrests of eight congressmen and the former head of the security police, the indictment of a state governor and the resignation of the foreign minister, whose brother and father were linked to paramilitaries. For the first time, military officers are being turned over for prosecution in civilian courts.

Most of this redounds to the credit of Álvaro Uribe, Colombia's president, who pushed through the demobilization plan despite criticism that it was too weak. Mr. Uribe is immensely popular in Colombia because he has greatly reduced homicides and kidnappings while overseeing rapid economic growth. Yet in Bogota on Sunday, Mr. Bush found himself obliged to defend Mr. Uribe against criticism that the exposure of the right-wing networks reflects poorly on his government.

The critics might have a point if Mr. Uribe had tried to shield political allies from the investigations. Instead he has urged that the probes go forward and has apologized for his faith in officials who proved compromised. The revelations come at an awkward moment for Colombia, with Congress considering Mr. Bush's request to extend Plan Colombia for several more years, at reduced levels of aid, and a free-trade agreement with Colombia. Yet Mr. Uribe has not flinched.

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Sure enough, opponents of trade agreements and those who reflexively resist U.S. military aid to Latin America are citing the paramilitary revelations as a reason not to support Mr. Uribe. In fact they prove that Colombia's president can deliver on his promise to reform the country's political system and extend its authority to a long-lawless countryside. If Congress wishes to see those changes continue, it should approve the new Colombian aid plan as well as the free-trade agreement.